


Tagion Technical Paper

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Abstract

This paper describes an alternative implementation of a Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) network compared to a classical network such as Bitcoin. Most other DLT networks use Proof-of-Work consensus mechanism to secure Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) of the data storage. In the Tagion network, the BFT is based on the Hashgraph algorithm and data storage on a new type of Distributed Hash Table (DHT) which makes it efficient to maintain a distributed database and guarantee BFT. The Hashgraph algorithm is deterministic and not probabilistic, allowing ordering of transactions. The order of transactions combined with the Lightning Network and the Tagion matching and settlement protocol constitutes a Decentralised Exchange (DEX) protocol on the Tagion network.

To reduce the probability for the network to be taken over by an evil group of actors, a new governance model is proposed, which does not rely on a central control or a group of master-nodes. It is built on the ideas of self-governance of common resources and democratic principles resulting in a Proof-of-People protocol and reputational scoring model that relies on the nodes to engage in dialogue with each other.

<https://cbleser@github.com/tagion/tagion-paper.git>
8181ceb6cdd912d9a284bf28607571d55ad2ddfb
version v1.155-master

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1 Governance

Tagion is a common resource(s) that constitutes the network, Tagion trademark, code and governance mechanisms, which are governed by a common resource governance model. The model is based on the ideas and design principles of Elinor Ostrom’s work with (self-)governing of the commons. The overall perception of resource governance in today’s society is between the extremes of private or state ownership. There is a third option called Commons, which can be translated to self-governance or community governance. It is much more efficient as well when it comes to governing of common resources, as Elinor Ostrom argues and proves. She won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 for her work within the field [7, 6]. We believe a monetary system and banking network should be a common resource because all users of it have an equal interest in the system; thus, the system should serve all interest equally by being governed as a common resource. Designing a governance model for a common requires clear rules for the boundaries, resources and actors in the system, which is described in this chapter. [8, 2, 5]

Tagion has three main governance types that are listed in table 1 and elaborated in the next sub-sections. More the common resources of Tagion are elaborated in section 1.4.

Governance Type	Purpose
Node	Defines rules and processes for nodes. I.e. algorithms controlling the node scoring model and proof-of-people protocol.
Economic	Defines rules and processes for economics in the system. I.e. algorithms controlling the rewards and fees.
System Upgrade	Defines rules and processes for system upgrades. I.e. algorithms for node software upgrades and script function upgrades.

Table 1: Overview of the three main governance types for the system: Node, Economic and System Upgrade Governance.

1.1 Node Governance

The purpose of Node Governance is to ensure that 2/3 of the nodes in the network are not evil actors. That is accomplished by a reputational scoring model and a proof-of-people protocol that is a social heuristic protocol. Both components are inspired by Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory of how species best survive in a new environment with the two main elements 1) most diversified paired genes and 2) caretaking of the offspring. These two elements are embedded in the scoring model and protocol.

Defining a node is done from democratic principles, where all can participate and where one person has one vote. These principles are translated into a permissionless system where one node has one vote, where one person only controls one node. It would ensure full distribution of nodes because centralisation is not possible. It is not possible to ensure 100% that one person can only control one node, but it is the aim. More, it is not required that the network is fully distributed to ensure the network is secure, the requirement is that it is distributed in a way, where many actors control an insignificant amount of nodes avoiding centralisation of power like in other networks, where few nodes may have majority control.

One of the downsides of democracy is that all have the same voting power independent of contribution. Thus, the Tagion system has a scoring system that values loyalty that is work through time, but still is open and fair for all to participate. The social component in the proof-of-people protocol tries to ensure that one person only has one node and is a real person. The protocol also selects users randomly to become nodes ensuring even distribution and fairness.

1.1.1 Reputational Scoring Model

The model consists of actors, variables and the boundaries of the actors, including the transition over a boundary.

The Actors in the Tagion Network are defined in table 2.

Actor	Description
All Users	All the users of the system defined loosely as anyone who has used the system.
Offline Nodes ON	Nodes not available for the network
Offline Prospect Nodes OP	Prospect nodes not available for the network
Online Users T	All online users in the system.
Prospect Nodes PN	PN are a subset of T , which are users who have received a node coupon and want to become a node.
Nodes N	N are a subset of T , which are users who have become verified as nodes and are available for the network.
Active Nodes AN	AN are a subset of N . AN operate and constitute the live Tagion network.

Table 2: The actors in the Tagion Network.

The variables of the actors and scoring rules for the model are defined in table 3.

Variable name	Definition and scoring rule
Birthdate	The date a prospect node becomes a node.
Gene	A gene is unique for each node.
Gene score (Gene-diversification points)	Each time a node mates with another node, a score is calculated for them both based on how diverse their genes are compared to each other. They mate each time verification of a prospect node takes place, when an active node makes an epoch, see section 2, and when two nodes choose to mate and validate each other.
Node age	A measure of a node's total available time for the network. Time as both a node and an active node. It increases both as a node and active node when available for the network.
Active time	Time as an active node. It increases when a node is active.
Prospect score	The Prospect score variable is a measure of how much the prospect node has been available to the network. It increases when the prospect node is available and decreases when not.
Contribution loyalty	A measure of how much the node has been active and stayed available. Non-availability of a node decreases contribution loyalty; being an active node increases loyalty.

Table 3: Variables and scoring rules for the reputational scoring model

The actors with their boundaries to each other and variables are illustrated in fig. 1, the boundaries and transition over them are described below.




Figure 1: Governance Model with actors, boundaries and variables in the Tagion system. The green triangle indicates an increase for the actor, the red triangle a decrease and the yellow an increase after an action i.e. a mating transaction.

The boundaries are labelled with numbers in fig. 1 which are defined as:

1. Any user can go from online to offline and vice versa. The network is open for all; it means anyone who has not yet used the system can become a user as well.
2. Any user can become a node over time and must first become a prospect node. The transition is based on a random selection, a lottery, to help ensure a broad representation of users as nodes. When going from a user to a prospect node or node, in general, the user is no longer anonymous, but a public servant with a public name record in the system section 4.1. See section 1.1.2 for the full protocol.
3. When a prospect nodes have been socially verified and earned enough prospect score that is being available for the network for a period of time then the prospect node becomes a node, i.e. born and receives a gene number and a birth date. See section 1.1.2 for the full protocol.
4. Nodes are chosen randomly within a given interval continues to be active nodes, and active nodes are chosen randomly to be inactive nodes. Nodes and active nodes are swapped back and forth continuously to make it impossible to predict, which nodes are active in 10 minute intervals, enhancing security. A node is selected by a Unpredictable Deterministic Random (**UDR**) algorithm, where the probability of being chosen as an active node or to continue as an active node depends on four variables: Gene score (**gs**), active time (**at**), node age (**no**) and contribution loyalty (**cl**).

$$P_{(active)}(gs, cl, na/at) \quad (1)$$

5. A node can go from online to offline and vice versa, if offline, it is not possible to be an active node or to become an active node.

6. A prospect node can go from online to offline and vice versa.

1.1.2 Proof-of-People

The Proof-of-People protocol is a heuristic protocol with a random and social component. Heuristic, because it aims to secure the democratic principles of one person one node and that it is an actual person behind a node. One person one node cannot be accomplished, but the social component would accomplish an approximation to this. The social component makes it difficult to manage more than one node, and the scoring mechanism makes it less favourable. The approximation would ensure a highly-distributed system when it is combined with a random selection of new prospect nodes. It means no actor or a few actors would control the network when the number of nodes has a certain size, making it secure.

The protocol for becoming a node is:

1. A user creates or has a name record in the system, see section [4.1](#).
2. A user has a name record with an age of more than one month. The user makes a prospect node record transaction where a node-transaction fee is paid together with a staked amount. The prospect node record contains the user's public key, has the stake attached to it and is linked to the name record.
3. With an average of 10 minutes, a prospect node record is chosen randomly, which burns the stake and gives a node coupon. Then the prospect node should send a proof of activity from within seven days. The proof is simply a public key to a bill in the DART, which are created within the last seven days.
4. When the user has sent the proof two random active nodes verify the proof and give a gene to the prospect by crossing their genes with each other. The gene is added to the prospect node record and both parents sign the prospect node record.
5. The rewarded node in the same epoch as where the coupon was issued is the first to identify the prospect in a dialogue. If the rewarded node validates the prospect, they make a mating transaction, which both signs. Both nodes receive gene score points for this transaction, and the mating transaction is linked to the prospect node's record. The gene score points are symbolised with the yellow triangle on fig. [1](#).
6. Two semi-determined identifications should be made by two of the next ten epoch rewarded nodes. The prospect engages in a dialogue with potential validators to get two mating transactions. Same mating transaction as in item [5](#).
7. Now the node has received three identifications, which means it can start participating as a prospect node on the network, receiving prospect score points. When the node has reached a prospect score threshold the step is completed.
8. A second semi-determined identification of the prospect is made with two nodes from the last ten epochs from the point the prospect score is reached. Same mating transaction as in item [5](#).
9. The last mating transaction creates a birth date in the prospect node record, making the prospect node a full node on the network.

There are three main components to the protocol:

1. The first selection of prospect nodes introduces a certain time-lag by the need of having a name record with an age of 1 month, and by having a stake amount and node transaction fee ensure small and zero transactions cannot be used to increase chances of winning the coupon. The fee and stake ensure commitment as well.
2. The requirement of activity within the last seven days creates a requirement for the user to have activity in the network.
3. A social component that forces new nodes to engage in dialogue with other nodes creating relations and communities. It is a local or virtual identification and dialogue with each other following the protocol. Both parties receive gene score points when mating raising the chance of rewards creating a direct economic incentive and indirectly by ensuring non-evil nodes in the system, ensuring the long-term sustainability and economic network worth of the system. Therefore, all nodes have a natural incentive to ensure that new nodes are real persons with honest intentions.

A premise for the social protocol to work is that users engage in dialogue; it requires social responsibility and engagement. As long as this premise is true, the node governance components can be adjusted based on the real experience with the test network, where a balance between the work and drag of being and becoming a node compared to the actual user adoption and distribution.

Besides the proof-of-people protocol, a continuous evaluation of nodes can be imaged. E.g. each month, all nodes need to engage in dialogue with 3 other nodes receiving gene score points. More, the future perspectives of sharding of the network would allow the network to be more local based removing cultural and language barriers, which can foster people to educate each other and build a culture around the network.

1.2 Economic Governance

The economic model of Tagion tries to stabilise the intrinsic value of the system, rather than being pegged to external currencies or assets. There are two main phases of economic governance, where the first is a linear and stable supply. The second phase builds on a model that aims to keep the intrinsic value of the currency stable by controlling the supply of money.

The idea is that money reflects the underlying value of an asset; money in itself does not have value. Production in our society creates the value: the assets, which values are represented by money, make them easy to trade. Being able to represent a value for the persons using the money need to trust that they can use the money elsewhere, and it needs to have a stable value over time. The reason a currency is trusted is that it has adoption and a stable value over time, and not because money is backed by gold or state-backed. Adoption of the Tagion network happens over time, but the stability of the Tagion currency need to be addressed, making it trusted.

1.2.1 Stable supply

Creating a stable supply with full transparency like in Bitcoin (though decreasing supply, stable) creates a trust in the system. No actor can create a significant supply and dilute the value and the trust in the system. Some systems have a built-in cap in the system, which need to be changed programmatically, like Bitcoin. Tagion does not have a built-in cap, because the supply of money should somehow correspond to the adoption, thus the representation of values in the system. Otherwise, destructive deflation in the system can happen to cause the real use of the system to fall, because people tend to hold and speculate with the money instead of using it. Of course, inflation can also be destructive, but a steady and in-significant increase in the supply of money should not create hyperinflation in the system. The most important thing would be that people keep using Tagions because they trust the money and do not hold on to them due to deflation. The first couple of years in a monetary systems lifetime high volatility is expected because of the low numbers of actors, which can easily both make the internal and external value go up and down because each actor's transaction can be significant in the system. As adoption occurs and the number of actors in the system becomes significant compared to a single actor, then price volatility decreases, because no single actor has a significant effect on the system. When this adoption size is reached, it leads us to the next phase, where an algorithm controlling the money supply is stabilising the intrinsic value.

1.2.2 Stable intrinsic value

Milton Friedman stated that “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”, it means it has nothing to do with the production in society [4]. The relation between money and the production in society can be expressed by the equation of exchange: [3]

$$M \cdot V = P \cdot Q \quad (2)$$

M is the quantity of money.

V is the velocity of money (the number of times per year the average currency in the money supply is spent).

P is the average price level of sold goods and services.

Q (or Y) is the real GDP for an economy.

This equation has some useful constructs of measure of money within a monetary system, but also an external measure of GDP, which is not available for Tagion because Tagion only measures on internal variables. Tagion sees an economic system as a flow system and not as static equilibrium. The constructs in the model are used but translated into a dynamic flow model with only internal variables. A translation of the constructs to variables in the Tagion system could be:

M is the quantity of Tagions in the system. That is a variable directly measurable in the system.

V is the number of times per year the average Tagion in the money supply is spent. It can be mapped to the variable of the number of transactions and average supply of money per year, which are direct variables in the system.

Q can be mapped with an average number of nodes in the system, which is an expression for users and adoption in the system thus how much of users' value does the system represent. More variables as the acceleration of transaction, average transaction per time unit, average transaction size and acceleration can all be potential variables for the constructs in the system.

P is the average price level in the Tagion monetary system, which can be expressed as:

$$P = \frac{M \cdot V}{Q} \quad (3)$$

The aim would be to keep the price level P stable, where the only controlled variable is the supply of money, which can be regulated after a model by an algorithm.

These variables need to be modelled, made construct-validation, correlation and causal-relation tests. It requires a system of a particular size and much testing to model this. Tagion is confident that it is possible to keep intrinsic stability by such a model in the system. The aim is not an xx % inflation target of the system, which makes no sense when external constructs as GDP are not measured, but to keep the intrinsic value in the system stable. It is accomplished by creating adoption of the system and an intrinsic stability mechanism in the system. It should generate long-term trust and stability over time, becoming a store of value. External parties must not control the money supply and system with their interest which delute the trust and value of the money.

1.3 System Upgrade Governance

Upgradability has been taken into consideration on two main levels: Node Software, which concerns the actual base protocols for running a node, and Script Function Upgrades, which concerns the function scripts in the network. All scripts are stored in the DART, meaning it does not require an upgrade of the base protocols, but just a change of script function state in the DART. Function scripts are node governance and economic governance algorithms.

1.3.1 Node Base Protocol Upgrade

Upgrade of the node base protocols should be backwards compatible with the previous version. It means the software can run the current network version and the new one, but it does not mean the networks are compatible, which can be divided into two categories minor and core upgrades:

Minor and bug-fixes upgrades This upgrade does not change the structure of the database and core algorithms, meaning that it can run in the same network as the current. It requires 5/6 of the active nodes to approve the upgrade.

Core and structural upgrades Core and structural upgrades make hard changes, which can be core algorithms for cryptography or structure of the database, which make the current network incompatible with the new one. It means that the nodes approve the new network operates both the current and new network in parallel until the upgrade is approved. It requires 5/6 majority of the active nodes to approve the upgrade and to enforce the new network version.

Script Function Upgrades Script function upgrades are when a script in the database in the network is changed, created or deleted. It does not require installation of a new binary on the computer the node is running on. Before a new function is approved, 5/6 of active nodes need to approve it.

1.4 Common Resources

The Tagion network is a common resource meaning any state or private entity should not own it because it serves a common purpose of the whole community and users of the system.

The resources are the actual network, governance mechanism all the IP (intellectual property) related to Tagion, which is listed below.

1.4.1 Open Source code

The source code is released under a GNU GPL or similar license and owned by the Tagion Foundation. The licensing is in process. Closed or commercial projects do need permission to use the source code. At the moment the git repository is not opened. Preparations to open the repository is being made. Before the open-source license is defined, and the open patent license has been given to the Tagion Foundation from I25S ApS, the repository cannot be opened. It is planned to open the project as soon as possible. People with legitimate reasons to verify the code can write to info@tagion.org and a copy of the source code can be shared after a signed NDA is in place.

1.4.2 Patents

EU patents are filed in the company name I25S ApS. The patents concern 1) a database system and 2) and network gossip protocol. The database system, which is implemented as the DART in Tagion, is a distributed database system that can efficiently search and store data based on a cryptographic hash enabling the network to execute transactions in parallel enabling performance and scalability. The gossip protocol is an efficient way to share information among all members of the network.

Open Licenses An open license is defined to be a free patent license given to the open-source project that cannot be revoked. All open-source projects having the same type of license as the Tagion Project are as a rule of thumb granted a free license that cannot be revoked automatically. Other open-source projects need to apply for an open license. The licenses cannot be revoked when first given. The Tagion Foundation and project is given an open license by I25S. Projects that fork the Tagion code need an open license by default.

1.4.3 “Tagion” Trademark

An EU Trademark is registered for “Tagion” and owned by the Tagion Foundation including related internet domains. The reason for the trademark is to make sure that projects, which are forking the source and governance model, cannot call themselves Tagion XYZ. It confuses the end-users and community thus multiple projects with similar names should be avoided. Tagion can protect itself from other projects or entities that wish to associate themselves with Tagion for malicious purposes.

2 Hashgraph Consensus Mechanism

The Tagion network is based around a Hashgraph consensus algorithm and mathematical proof discovered by Leemon Baird [1]. This algorithm solves the Byzantine Generals' Problem of generating a consensus order list of actions between distributed computer nodes connected in a network. If more than 2/3 of the nodes follows the same consensus rules, all the nodes will, in finite time, reach the same order of events. The network distributes the information via a gossip protocol, sending information about the data received from the other nodes in the network. All the nodes solving the Hashgraph algorithm will come to the same order of transactions. Figure 1 below shows a Hashgraph of gossip information representing the information flow between network nodes. In finite time all nodes in the network will be able to build the same Hashgraph of gossip information.




Figure 2: Hashgraph with parameter Ω

Each vertical line represents a compute node and each circle an event. The line between the events represents the communication of the events between the nodes. The events coloured red define a witness that is used to divide the consensus into rounds. Each round decides a list of events to be collected. This list of events is called an epoch and must be sorted into the same order as all other nodes. The description of the Hashgraph algorithm can be found in [1].

2.1 Gossip protocol and Wavefront propagation

The Hashgraph algorithm uses a gossip protocol called “gossip about gossip” to propagate information between the nodes. It means node A sends all the information of the communication that it knows to a randomly selected node B. This enables node B to construct the same Hashgraph as node A.

In the Tagion network, a protocol called Wavefront is used to exchange information between two nodes, ensuring that node A and B only need to communicate three times to share the state of the graph. Each node keeps track of an integer value called Altitude. Altitude is increased by one for each event created by the node. Each node stores its current view of Altitude for each node in the network. By exchanging information about the Altitude between two nodes, both can figure out if their Wavefront is higher and send a list of events which are in front. The Wavefront information exchange has four states:

1. Node A selects random Node B and sends a list of all Altitudes. This state is called a tidal-wave.
2. Node B receives a tidal-wave from Node A. If Node B has already sent a tide-wave to Node A, then Node B will send what is called a breaking-wave to Node A. Otherwise Node B will return a list of all events which are in front of the tidal-wave of Node A. This state is called first-wave.
3. If Node A receives a first-wave from Node B, it returns a list of all the events which are in front of Node B. When this state has been reached the wavefront exchange ends.
4. If Node A or Node B receives a breaking-wave, the wavefront communication is dropped. This prevents both nodes from going into an infinity echo where they forever send information back and forth. In the network, a node will often have many simultaneous wavefront connections so it will sometimes receive the same event package from other nodes. Then it will drop any duplicated events it receives.

2.2 Consensus Ordering

In the Tagon implementation of the Hashgraph algorithm, an Event is only allowed to point one or none “other parent” which is called a “father-event” as shown on fig. 3. This strategy aids to solve the graph forking problem and simplifies the consensus ordering.

The “self-parent” is defined as a “mother-event” in the Tagon implementation. An event must have a mother-event but doesn't have to have a father-event.

Each event points to the previous event called mother-event, and some also point to another father-event. The mother-event is defined as the previous event from the same node. The father is an event sent via the gossip network from another node.

The order Ω is calculated as:

$$\Omega_{B,k+1} = \max(\Omega_{A,k}, \Omega_{B,k}) + 1 \quad (4)$$

The events in the epoch list are sorted by the order Ω . If the order of two events is equal, the hash h of the event is used to calculate the order. The following expression is used to order the events:

$$l_{A,B} = \begin{cases} \Omega_A < \Omega_B & \text{if } (\Omega_A \neq \Omega_B) \\ H(h_A \parallel h_B) < H(h_B \parallel h_A) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

The parameter $l_{A,B}$ is 'true' if event A is ordered before event B.




Figure 3: Events and relations

3 Distributed Database (DART)

Distributed Archive of Random Transactions (**DART**) is built to store and keep track of transactions in the Tagion network. The database efficiently handles the removal and addition of transactions in a secure and distributed manner. Each transaction is stored in a distributed hash-table using a cryptographic hash of the transaction T data. Each transaction is identified by a unique hash value h . The transaction is put into a table ordered by the numerical value of the hash.

$$h = H(T), h \in [0 : 2^{N-1} - 1], N \in \mathbb{N} \quad (6)$$

$$S_i \in [i \cdot 2^{N-M} : (i+1) \cdot 2^{N-M}], i \in [0 : m-1], m = 2^M \quad (7)$$

H is the cryptography hash function

N represents the number of bits

M represents the bit width of the sector

h hash value

S is sections

m hash-table divided into sections S




Figure 4: The structure of the DART database

3.1 Sparse Merkle Tree

The data in a section is mapped using a Sparse Merkle Tree (*SMT*) which make it efficient to add and remove archives into the Merkle tree.

The hash point into the DART is divided by rims. Rim zero is the most significant byte (MSB) of the hash fingerprint of the archive. Rim one is the next byte in the hash etc.

In the current implementation of the DART, the first two rims are used as the section index. Thus the DART has a total number of indices $2^{16} = 65536$ which is equivalent to the two bytes unsigned number.

Each section stores the archive in a hash table. An SMT is used as a look-up table, and each rim is sectioned into a sub sparse Merkle tree. It means that rim two is the first SMT and rim three is the second SMT etc.

As a comparison, a traditional Merkle tree with $2^{24} = 8^3 \approx 16 \cdot 10^6$ Archives. To calculate a full Merkle tree, it requires the calculation of around $32 \cdot 10^6$ hashes. By contrast, using an SMT with $16 \cdot 10^6$ archives mean just around 2000 hashes have to be calculated.

Core protocol updates

The DART will be used for protocol updates by the following consensus. One or more nodes will need to run the new protocol update in a parallel DART containing the same transaction information as the current accepted DART. The new DART will have a new Bull's eye, and this will result in a fork of the Bull's eye chain. When the majority of the nodes run the newly upgraded nodes, they can decide to drop support for the old DART and run the new DART. When enough nodes stop running the old DART, it will not be able to reach a consensus, and the upgrade has completed.

DART garbage collection

A garbage collection script will run every (G) epoch and remove all the bills which are older than a specified date. Bills that have not been used for a long period will be burned, which ensures that the system does not contain dead bills/money. It is the owner's responsibility to recycle their bills before the expiry date.

4 Special Records

The archives stored in the DART using the hash-fingerprint as an index-pointer like in Distribute Hash Table (**DHT**) (See section 3). The hash of an archive is calculated in two ways as follows, if the archive does not contain *#'param'* the hash is calculated from the binary data of the HiBON archive and if the *#'param'* exists this type of archive is call Parameter Indexed Archive (**PIA**). For a PIA the hash-pointer is calculated for the content of the *#'param'*.

Parameter starting with a dollar sign is reserved for use as system parameters (like *\$'param'*) and should only be used for as such, or else the system will reject it as an error. Especially the *\$type* is used to set the type of an HiBON object. An PIA-archive must contain a *\$type* parameter.

Some of the parameter in those special archive has restricted access. The access **ro** means that this parameter is set on the creation of the archive and can not be changed. The **rc** access means that this parameter is controlled and updated by the network and can only be read.

4.1 Name card contract

A Network Name Card (**NNC**) is a record which are composed of two archives Name Card Label (**NCL**) and Name Card Record (**NCR**) both of the archives are stored in the DART.

The NCL label card sets the NNC name and NCR record stores the data related to the name-card (see table 5). The two archives are always updated in pairs in the network.

The hash-pointer of an NCL is calculated for the name-parameter and not for the archives in itself. The NCL can and must only contain the parameter as shown in the table 4.

When an NNC is updated the NCR is updated, the *\$previous* hash-pointer is set to the previous NCR and the *\$index* is increased by one. The *\$record* parameter in NCL is set to the hash-pointer of NCR and *\$sign* is set to the signature of *\$record*.

The *\$index* of the first NCR is set to 0, and the *\$previous* parameter is to hash value of *\$pubkey* of the NCL archive.

The *\$lang* sets the type of restricted letters and symbols which is allowed to be used in the NNC name.

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$type</i>	Set contract type to 'NCL'	string	ro
<i>#name</i>	Name of the name-card	string	ro
<i>\$lang</i>	Language letter code	string	ro
<i>\$time</i>	Creation date	utc	ro
<i>\$pkey</i>	Public key	ubyte[]	ro
<i>\$sign</i>	Signature of the <i>\$record</i>	ubyte[]	rc
<i>\$record</i>	Hash pointer to the NCR archive	ubyte[]	rc

Table 4: NCL Network Name Card

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$type</i>	Sets the contract type to 'NCR'	string	ro
<i>\$name</i>	Hash value of the <i>NCR.\$name</i>	ubyte[]	ro
<i>\$previous</i>	Hash pointer to the previous NCR	ubyte[]	rc
<i>\$index</i>	Index number	uint	rc
<i>\$node</i>	Optional node record	#	rc
...	...	...	...

Table 5: NCR Network Name Record

4.2 Node contract

Network Node Record (*NNR*) is used to store the node data of the record

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$type</i>	Set contract type to 'NNR'	string	ro
<i>#node</i>	Public key for the node	ubyte[]	ro
<i>\$name</i>	Hash value of the <i>NCR.\$name</i>	#	ro
<i>\$time</i>	Creation date	utc	ro
<i>\$sign</i>	Signature of <i>\$name</i> by <i>NCR.\$pkey</i>	ubyte[]	rc
<i>\$state</i>	The state of the (<i>PN</i> , <i>N</i> , <i>AN</i>)	uint	rc
<i>\$gene</i>	Node gene bit-string	ubyte[]	rc

Table 6: NNR Network Node Record

4.3 Sub-Network contract

Via a special contract executed on the Tagion Main Network (*TMN*) a Tagion Sub Network (*TSN*) can be launched, this sub-network will create a new sub-DART which only can be updated from the nodes running the TSN.

A group of nodes can initiate the sub-network by signing this contract and stake an amount in TGS.

The rules for the TSN is set when the network is launched, and the rules can differ from the rules in TMN. The TSN can be assigned to a group of nodes or fully open for all nodes. When a TSN is launched an Tagion Sub Network Funds (*TSNF*) is created on the main network to hold the funds for the fees in the main network. The funds are used to pay rewards to the nodes running the TSN and to pay fees to the main. When an epoch is created in TSN the bull's eye for TSN, a contract is automatically sent to the MTN, and a fee is deducted from the TSNF account and burned. If there are not enough funds in the TSNF account, TMN rejects the contract.

TGS used in the TSN must be locked in a Tagion Sub Network Account (*TSNA*) these funds can only be transferred between other TSNA and to the TSNF. Funds can not be transferred from TSNF to a TSNA.

The funds in TSNA can be transferred to TGS-bills again via TSNA-contract this contract can take multiple TSNA as input and will transfer all the funds to bills on the output, all the input TSNA will be deleted from DART as is the case with TGS-bills.

Basic rules for a Sub-Network

- §1 TSN can have a different rule set then applies for TMN
- §2 No nodes can transfer money out of a TSNF account
- §3 An TSNF account is used to pay rewards to the TSN nodes and the burning fees to the TMN
- §4 An TSNA account funds can be transferred to a TSNF account
- §5 An TSNA account can transfer money to other TSNA accounts. The fees burned is a little higher than fees for bills.
- §6 The rewards in the TSN is paid from the TSNF account because a TSN can not print TGS as rewards as is the case for TSN.

5 Scripting Engine

The scripting engine's language is called Funnel. It is based on a stack machine, which is a simple, functional language inspired by the programming language FORTH.

The scripting engine executes at different run levels. The lowest level is full Turing equivalent and is only able to make conditional forward jumps; it cannot run loops or functions. The scripting engine is limited by a number of instructions executed, call stack depth, data stack depth and memory.

The limitation is done to prevent a script running into infinite loops. The transaction script can use a library of standard function which is stored in the DART, and the fingerprint of the script which is stored in the Bull's eye blockchain that is the current state of the script.

Run level	Description	Limitation
0	Consensus script	No limits, full Turing equivalent
1	Debug script function (read-only)	Limit resources, read-only call function to level 0
2	Transaction function	Limit resources and call function to levels 0 and 1
3	Transaction script	Limit instruction and call function to level 2

Table 7: Runlevels for the Scripting engine

In contrast, to standard FORTH Funnel is a strictly typed language which is supporting the types shown in table 8.

Converting from one type to another must be explicitly instructed via a type casting function. If the casting fails, the scripting engine generates an error and the script stops. The scripting engine stops on overflow/underflow/divide-by-zero errors and if an operator is operating on invalid types.

name	Description	D-Type
TEXT	UTF-8 text	string
INTEGER	signed 64-bits number	long
CARDINAL	Unsigned 64-bits number	ulong
BIG	Unsigned big integer number	BigUint
HiBON	HiBON Read/Write-only	HiBON
DOCUMENT	HiBON Read only	Document
BIN	Byte arrays, used to hold keys and hash value	ubyte[]

Table 8: Scripting types supported

Funnel Sample code for a test contract

```

1 variable trans_obj
2 variable trans_scrip_obj
3 variable signatures
4 variable hash_trans_scrip_obj
5 variable payees
6 variable payers
7 variable no_payers

```

```

8 variable no_signatures
9 variable scrip_eng_obj
10 variable bills
11 variable no_bills
12
13 : loadtransactionobject
14     trans_obj !
15     trans_obj @ 'transaction_scripting_object' doc@
16     trans_scrip_obj !
17     trans_obj @ 'signatures' doc@
18     signatures !
19     trans_scrip_obj @ hash256
20     hash_trans_scrip_obj !
21     trans_scrip_obj @ 'payees' doc@
22     payees !
23     trans_scrip_obj @ 'payers' doc@
24     payers !
25     payers @ length@ no_payers !
26     signatures @ length@ no_signatures !
27 ;
28
29 : loadscriptingengineobject
30     scrip_eng_obj !
31     scrip_eng_obj @ 'bills' doc@
32     bills !
33     bills @ length@ no_bills !
34     scrip_eng_obj @ 'transaction_object' doc@
35     loadtransactionobject
36 ;
37
38 : get_payee_ownerkey
39     local _payee
40     local _payees
41     local _index
42     _index !
43     _payees !
44     _payees @ _index @ doc@ _payee !
45     _payee @ 'ownerkey' doc@
46 ;

```

6 Transaction Scripts

When the network receives a transaction request, it is added in an epoch and executed by the scripting engine. A transaction request includes a transaction object which is a data package in HiBON format. The HiBON object contains input bill numbers and the transaction script including a list of digital signatures which signs the transaction script object. The signatures can be verified via the public keys represented in the input bills.

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$type</i>	Set contract type to 'B0'	string	ro
<i>\$V</i>	Value	ulong	ro
<i>\$k</i>	Epoch number	uint	ro
<i>\$T</i>	Bill type	string	ro
<i>\$Y</i>	Doubled hashed Owner key	ubyte[]	ro
...	...	...	...

Table 9: Standard archived Bill object

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$in</i>	Array of Bill numbers and public keys	[]	ro
<i>\$read</i>	Array of Bill numbers and public keys	[]	ro
<i>\$out</i>	Array of public key hashes	[]	ro
<i>\$params</i>	Parameters used by the script	{}	ro
<i>\$script</i>	Transaction script	{}	ro

Table 10: Transaction scripting object

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$record</i>	Scripting object	{}	ro
<i>\$signs</i>	Array of input signatures	[]	ro

Table 11: Transaction object

Transaction Epoch consensus rules:

1. If one or more script object is found with the same input bill number, the first transaction object in the epoch is kept in the epoch list. Any other object flows in the list are removed.

Transaction object initial consensus rules:

1. The size of the inputs array in the script record must be one or more.
2. The size of the inputs array and the signature arrays must be the same size.
3. The bill type of the first type input must be a Tagion type.
4. Duplicate bill numbers are not allowed.

5. All the inputs must be in the current state of the DART.

If a transaction object violates one of the initial consensus rules, it is handled by a violation script function.

Transaction scripting execution: Because the epoch list is guaranteed to prevent inputs with same bill number, a node can choose to execute the scripts in the epoch in parallel.

First execution procedure and rules:

1. The bills within the node's DART angle are read from the DART.
2. The read bills are gossiped to the network.
3. If the script object has only one input, the script is immediately executed.
4. If all the bills in the inputs are covered in the local DART, the script is executed immediately.

Second execution procedure and rules:

1. The script is executed if all the inputs are received or read for a transaction object and the signatures are correct.
2. The script must finish with a burn function which burns the transaction fee.
3. If the sum of all outputs of the bill type Tagions (bill type can be Tagions or external contracts of, e.g. Euros) is greater than the sum of the input minus the transaction fee, the first input bill is scheduled to be removed, and the transaction is ignored.
4. If the sum of all outputs of types other than Tagion is greater than the input, the first input bill is scheduled to be removed, and the transaction is ignored.

DART execution procedure:

1. When all scripts have been executed, the process of updating the DART begins.
2. All inputs of successfully executed scripts must be removed from sections covered by the node.
3. All outputs of the successfully executed script must be added to the sections covered by the node.
4. All the Merkle roots within the section angle must be calculated and signed and gossiped to the network. Note: From this point, the node can start executing the next epoch.
5. When the node has received the majority for all the sections' Merkle, it calculates the Bull's eye of the DART, which is signed and gossiped to the network.
6. When the majority of consistent Bull's eyes has been received, the node decides that the DART has been updated and change states. Note: A transaction has been completed at the new state.
7. If one of the above rules fails, the DART is reverted to the previous state.

Note: When a node receives a transaction object, it can send a request to the DART to collect the inputs of the script. By doing the execution in parallel, it improves the transaction time instead of starting to collect inputs when the epoch has been completed.

7 Business Model

The business model consists of two parts incentives and fee payments. The incentives are given to the nodes for their work and fees paid by the users for using the system.

Money printing - incentives New money is added to the system when an epoch has been completed, and the DART has reached consensus. The newly printed money is rewarded to one of the active nodes if it has successfully executed the epoch.

The reward winning node is selected via a UDR Lottery, which is seeded from the Bull's eye hash of the DART where the epoch was generated.

The amount is calculated by an economic protocol controlled by the economic governance, see section [1.2](#).

Money burning - payment When a transaction is performed in the network, more fees are paid by the user initiating the transaction. The fees depend on storage, transaction amount and script execution load. The fees paid to the network is burned; thus, the amount is taken out of the money supply. A storage fee is paid per bytes of the total sum of bytes of all outputs stored in the DART.

A transaction fee is paid as a fraction of the total Tagion amount of the input of the transaction script.

The execution fee is calculated per script instructions where each instruction is priced.

If total Tagion amount of output transaction script is less than a specified limit, the whole amount is burned and the transaction not valid. Fees for decentralised exchange are described in section [11](#).

8 Parallelism

Transactions with independent bills can run in parallel, enabling scalability and performance. Independent bills mean that inputs and outputs of transactions are not the same bills. It can run in parallel because the overall design of the data, DART and the scripting engine makes it possible.

The scripting engine is an event-driven engine that executes functions in parallel with inputs and produces outputs locally on each node. Inputs which must be used are read from the DART, and the outputs are stored in the DART. When the transaction successfully completes, the inputs are deleted.

The database is distributed thus nodes only maintain and keep a copy of the part of the database they subscribed to, see section 3. Because transactions' inputs and outputs are independent and each node only executes a part of the transactions, they can be executed in parallel and the database updated in parallel as well.

It is not the transaction instructions, which are stored in the database, but the actual bills, which are used as inputs and outputs. Then all nodes do not need to execute all data to verify the integrity of the database as in typical blockchain structures. The consensus event and consensus data are thus mere an intermediate calculation, where the output is stored.

9 Node Stack

The node stack is implemented in the programming language D with some C libraries for crypto functions. It is structured, as shown in the figure below.

HRPC (HiBON) Dataformat for communication	
NODE	
User API - TLS 1.2	P2P Network
Scripting Engine	
Consensus mechanism : Hashgraph	
Storage : Distributed Database DART	
Storage state : Blockchain	

Table 12: Tagion Node stack

A Tagion Node is divided into units as shown in fig. 6 and each unit handles a service function in the following manner:

A smart-contract is sent to the Transaction-service-unit fetching the inputs from the DART unit and verifying their signatures. The DART-unit connects to other DARTs via the P2P-unit. The transaction-unit forwards the smart-contract including the inputs to the Coordinator-unit and this unit adds it to an event that is gossiped to the network via the P2P-unit.

When the Coordinator receives an event with a smart-contract, it is executed via the Scripting-Engine-unit, and the result of outputs are verified.

When the Coordinator finds an epoch, this epoch is forwarded to the Transcript-service-unit that evaluates the correct order and request the DART-unit to erase the inputs and add the newly generated outputs.




Figure 6: The Tagion Node service structure

Each of the services is running as independent tasks and communication between each-other via commutation channels. The different services modules perform the service as described in the list below.

- Coordinator*** This services manage the hashgraph-consensus and controls other related service for the node. The Coordinator generates and receives events and relays to the network. This services also generate the epoch and send the information to the ScriptingEngine services.
- Transaction*** This service receives the incoming transaction script, validate, verifies and fetches the data from the DART and sends the information to the Coordinator.
- DART*** Services to the Distributed-database.
- P2P*** This service handles the peer-to-peer communication protocol used to communicate between the nodes
- ScriptingEngine*** Handles the executions of the scripts
- Transcript*** Services the Epoch and orders the script execution.
- Logger*** The service handles the information logging for the different services
- Monitor*** The Monitor service is used to monitor the activities locally.
- HeartBeat*** This services is only used in test-mode. This service enables the nodes to execute sequentially, simplifying network debugging.

10 Privacy

The current banking system achieves a level of privacy by keeping key information hidden from the public. Under this regime, all identities are known by the trusted third party, i.e. the bank.

In the Tagion system, all transactions and bills are public, but physical identities are separated from transactions and bills. The system has full transparency regarding how many bills exist. A public key is bound to a bill and not an account, and the private key is for signing and spending the bill.




Figure 7: Private and Public domain

Tagion bills are not linked in a chain because each time a bill is spent, a transaction is recorded in the database, deleting the old bill and creating a new one. A full trace of the network will, however, reveal the inputs and outputs of transactions, thus linking the bills. Over time the bills split and re-combine as they become part of multiple in and out transactions. Therefore, it is not feasible to search back through the linking of bills for a pattern, because it is not a 1:1 trace of bills and would cause an NP (non-polynomial) problem, which cannot be solved in finite time.




Figure 8: A transaction is represent as a hexagon with a flame the small-bank-note with a **t** represent bills

A user can determine if the same public key should be the owner on all his/her bills or a different, derived, public key. They can hold a different public key for each owned bill, and these keys may not correlate with each other. By using a different public key for each node, a user can make transactions in full privacy, i.e. anonymously.

A node is a public servant and therefore needs to reveal public information. A node in the Tagion system needs to use a fixed public key to ensure the governance of the node. The public key is the identifier for the node that can be perceived as an account, and it is the account for receiving rewards.

11 Decentralised Exchange using Lightning Network

Via a TSN interfacing other alien Distributed Ledger Technology (*DLT*) for exchanges is possible. Most of the current DLT's is based on Proof Of Work (*POW*) which secures the immutability of the ledger and has been proven to be very robust. The downside for those types DLT's is the long confirmation time.

A suggested solution to decreasing the confirmation time is to use a second layer solution using a network of payment channels like the Lightning Network (*LN*).

Tagion Network (*TN*) and LN support each other to enable a Decentralised Exchange (*DEX*) for DLT networks which support full-duplex payment channels, Hashed Time Lock Contract (*HTLC*) and Multi Signature (*MultSig*). The advantage of using the TN as a support system to store intermediate data for the payment channels is that the LN-nodes can share data even if some of the LN nodes go offline. In the current LN use in Bitcoin and other similar networks, the routing between the payment channels is a challenge, one of the reasons for this is that the routing tables are difficult to share and maintain between the nodes, but because data is stored in a DART this makes sharing data feasible.

Because funds in alien DLT can be locked via an HTLC, the alien-currency (*ALC*) the funds can be swapped with the native tagion-currency in an atomic manner. This feature enables the Tagion network to support exchange functionality in a decentralised manner providing full liquidity because all exchange pairs have Tagions as the counterpart.

11.1 Trading flow using Lightning and Tagion Network

The Tagion network can order the bids/asks in a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (*BFT*) manner, this means that the network is able to come to a consensus on the order of transaction and this solves the matching and prices discovery in a fair manner and solver front-running the order-book in a decentralised manner.

The idea is one STN handles only one trading pair between TGS and ALC. By only using one pair the matching and routing problem is reduced significantly in comparison to a full multi-currency-DEX with more than two currencies.

First of all, the price discovery is more straightforward, and the amount of data to process is much less if only one pair much be matched and discovered. The second advantage of the one pair DEX is that sub-network only need to handle one alien smart contract format.

11.1.1 Price discovery and matching

The DEX are able to handle two type of orders as shown in table 14 and table 13. The orders are sent to the TN and at each epoch the trade-order-queue is sorted according to the hashgraph consensus ordering.

Exchange order pairs

ATO Order to buy TGS for ALC

BTO Order to buy ALC for TGS

The matching-engine will maintain two sales-lists of Ask Trade Orders (*ATO*) and a Bid Trade Orders (*BTO*), those sales-lists are sorted according to the exchange rate with lowest exchange ratio at to top of the list. A detailed example can be found in appendix E.

The **ask** exchange rate is defined as:

$$E_{ask} = \frac{Q}{P} \text{ in unit } [ACL/TGS] \quad (8)$$

The **bid** exchange rate is defined as:

$$E_{bid} = \frac{P}{Q} \text{ in unit } [TGS/ACL] \quad (9)$$

P is the price in TGS

Q is the price in ACL

The trade-order-queue is maintained with the orders that are not executed. A new trade-order-queue is generated in each epoch and added in the end of the current trade-order-queue. The matching executes the first in trade-order-queue, i.e. the oldest order is searched first for a match.

The ATO and BTO orders in the trade-order-queue are defined as buyers. A match is defined to be found, when the buyer's exchange-rate is higher or equal than the seller's exchange-rate from the corresponding sales-list. The price of the settlement will be set at seller's exchange-rate.

- When an ATO buys from BTO-sales-list at $E_{ask,BTO}$ price when:
 $E_{ask,ATO} \geq E_{ask,BTO}$ or the same as $\frac{Q_{ATO}}{P_{ATO}} \geq \frac{Q_{BTO}}{P_{BTO}}$.
- When an BTO buys from ATO-sales-list at $E_{bid,ATO}$ price when:
 $E_{bid,BTO} \geq E_{bid,ATO}$ or the same as $\frac{P_{BTO}}{Q_{BTO}} \geq \frac{P_{ATO}}{Q_{ATO}}$.

Summarising, a buyer with an ATO-order from the order-queue matches a seller with a BTO-order from the BTO-sales-list and vice versa. Then the size is calculated, and a trading-contract with the corresponding pair is generated and stored in the TN.

If the ATO or the BTO has sold the whole size, then the order is removed from the lists. If an order includes a valid time period of t and if the epoch consensus time is greater than this valid time period t then the order is removed and not executed.

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
$\$type$	Set the contract type to 'ATO'	string	ro
P	Price unit TGS	ulong	ro
Q	Price unit ACL	ulong	ro
$size$	Size of ACL	ulong	ro
$lock$	Random Hash-lock key	bin	ro
$time$	Valid time period	utc	ro

Table 13: ATO HiBON to buy TGS for ALC

Parameter	Description	Unit	Access
$\$type$	Sets the contract type to 'BTO'	string	ro
P	Price unit TGS	ulong	ro
Q	Price unit ACL	ulong	ro
$size$	Size og TGS	ulong	ro
$lock$	Random Hash-lock key	bin	ro
$time$	Valid time period	utc	ro

Table 14: BTO HiBON to buy ALC for TGS

11.1.2 Exchange execution rules




Figure 9: Tagion Decentralised Exchange based on Lightning Network

In the following example, the execution flow of the DEX is described.

Alice wants to trade TGS for ALC (ATO). It can be done as follows

- A.1 **Entry:** Alice opens an LN channel with Bob.
- A.2 Alice requests a trading channel from Bob with a guarantee of $\omega_{alice,S}$ in ALC
- A.3 Bob locks up a guarantee of an amount $\tau_{bob,S}$ in TGS which matching Alice's $\omega_{alice,S}$ amount. Bob creates an HTLC lock it with R_{bob} and send this information to the TN.
- A.4 Alice pays ω_{alice} to the contract lock with R_{bob} .

A.5 **Order:** Alice sends an order to the TN including an HTLC contract to Bob locked with R_{alice} and the amount α_{alice} in ALC. The information includes the bid/ask prices and HTLC contract which is sent to the TN.

Note: Carol has previously locked funds with R_{calor} in TGS to buy ALC

A.6 When the TN discovers a trading pair matching Alice and Carol the network generated a TN-HTLC trading contract locked with both R_{alice} and R_{carol} .

A.7 When Bob verifies that Carol has to reveal R_{calor} . Bob initials a route between Alice to Carol according to the trading bill. Bob also makes an HTLC return the rest of Alice funds locked with R_{alice} .

A.8 Alice reveals R_{alice} and the funds can be transferred.

A.9 **Exit:** Alice can ask Bob to reveal R_{bob} and exit the trading channel. The locked Bob's locked funds are returned, and Alice can claim her funds.

Carol wants to trade ALC for TGS (BTO). It can be done as follows

B.1 **Entry:** Carol opens an LN channel with Dave.

B.2 Carol requests a trade channel with Dave, both Carol and Dave guarantee of $\tau_{carol,S}$ and $\tau_{dave,S}$ in TGS and hash-locked with R_{carol} in the TN.

B.3 **Order:** Carol sends an order to Dave via the TN.

B.4 Dave receives a confirmation from the network about the order from Carol.

B.5 Dave and creates an HTLC contract to Carol locked with R_{dave} at the amount of $\alpha_{carol,T}$ in ALC.

B.6 When the TN discovers a trading pair matching Alice and Carol the network generated a TN-HTLC trading contract locked with both R_{alice} and R_{carol} .

B.7 Dave reveals the R_{dave} the Alice can execute the trade.

B.8 **Exit:** Carol can ask Dave to reveal R_{dave} and exit the trading channel. The locked Dave's and Carol's locked funds are returned.




Figure 10: DEX transaction flow

Incentives and Penalty If one or more of the 4 participants (Alice, Bob, Carol and Dave) fail's to executed the trade the flowing penalty rules will be performed by the TN consensus.

§1 Alice doesn't claim the transaction

Incident

- If Alice does not reveal R_{alice} within the timeout limit.

Action

- After a timeout period less than the Alice HLTC time lock.
- The funds will be revoked to Carol.
- The trade is deleted.
- Bob keeps Alice's stacked fund's.
- If the price of Alice's funds is less than Bob's guaranteed fund's. Bob gets some of his fund's back, which corresponds to the current trading prices.
- The rest of Bob funds is burned.
- If Alice reveals the R_{alice} after the timeout, Alice losses her funds to Carol.

§2 Bob doesn't initial the routing

Incident

- If Bob is offline or chose not find establish connection within the a timeout period.

Action

- Bob loss his funds and the trade bill is deleted.
- Carol's funds is returned.
- Alice will get her funds back after the HTLC time lock runs out.

§3 Carol doesn't claim the transaction

Incident

- Carol does not reveal the R_{carol} within the timeout limit.

Action

- If Bob makes creates a contract which returns Alice's funds with a time limit Bob get's his funds back.
- Carol's transaction stake is given is burned and the rest of the funds is return to Carol.
- The transactions bill is deleted.

§4 Dave doesn't accepts the routing

Incident

- If Dave is offline or chose not find establish connection within the a timeout period.

Action

- After the timeout Carol can reclaim the stack ω_{carol} and open a new channel with Eric.
- Dave's stack ω_{dave} is burned
- Carol can initial the trade by revealing R_{carol} .
- The transactions bill is deleted after execution.

A HiBON Data format

All data exchanged and stored in the network is structured using a data format called Hash-invariant Binary Object Notation (*HiBON*) which inspired by Binary JSON (*BSON*) but to compatible with. In HiBON the keys are sorted according to the ordering rules described below (in D-lang). By ordering the keys, the data is hash invariant for the same collection.

```
1 @safe
2 bool less_than(string a, string b) pure
3     in {
4         assert(a.length > 0);
5         assert(b.length > 0);
6     }
7 body {
8     static bool is_index(string a, out uint result) pure {
9         import std.conv : to;
10        enum MAX_UINT_SIZE=to!string(uint.max).length;
11        if ( a.length <= MAX_UINT_SIZE ) {
12            if ( a[0] == '0' ) {
13                return false;
14            }
15            foreach(c; a[1..$]) {
16                if ( (c < '0') || (c > '9') ) {
17                    return false;
18                }
19            }
20            immutable number=a.to!ulong;
21            if ( number <= uint.max ) {
22                result = cast(uint)number;
23                return true;
24            }
25        }
26        return false;
27    }
28    uint a_index;
29    uint b_index;
30    if ( is_index(a, a_index) && is_index(b, b_index) ) {
31        return a_index < b_index;
32    }
33    return a < b;
34 }
```

Only printable ASCII keys are allowed to be used as keys in the HiBON; this means no control characters or special characters allowed. The key is validated accordingly to the function described below.

```
1 @safe bool is_key_valid(string a) pure nothrow {
2     enum : char {
3         SPACE = 0x20,
4         DEL = 0x7F,
```

```

5         DOUBLE_QUOTE = 34,
6         QUOTE = 39,
7         BACK_QUOTE = 0x60
8     }
9     if ( a.length > 0 ) {
10         foreach(c; a) {
11             // Chars between SPACE and DEL is valid
12             // except for " ' ` is not valid
13             if ( (c <= SPACE) || (c >= DEL) ||
14                 ( c == DOUBLE_QUOTE ) || ( c == QUOTE ) ||
15                 ( c == BACK_QUOTE ) ) {
16                 return false;
17             }
18         }
19         return true;
20     }
21     return false;
22 }

```

Data type	Code	D-Type	Description
float64	0x01	double	64bit floating point
string	0x02	string	UTF-8 string
Embedded document	0x03	{}	HiBON object
Embedded array	0x04	[]	HiBON Array object (Only index numbers allowed)
Boolean	0x08	bool	Boolean false=0, true=1
64bits UTC Time	0x09	utc	UTC datetime 64bits signed integer
int32 number	0x10	int	32bit unsigned number
int64 number	0x12	long	64bits signed integer
float128	0x13	decimal	128bits floating point
Big integer	0x18	bigint	Signed big integer
uint32	0x20	uint	32bit unsigned number
float32	0x21	float	32bit floating point
uint64	0x22	ulong	64bit unsigned number
Big integer	0x28	ubigint	Unsigned big integer
Native Document	0x43	Document	Reserved for internal use only
Defines Array	0x80	void	Reserved type for internal use only
Array of float64	0x81	double[]	Array of unsigned 64bits integer (size is multiple of 8bytes)
Binary string	0x85	ubyte[]	Array of bytes (size is multiple of 1bytes)
Array of int32	0x90	int[]	Array of 32bits signed integers (size is multiple of 4bytes)
Array of int64	0x92	long[]	Array of 64bits signed integer (size is multiple of 8bytes)
Array of int32	0x90	int[]	Array of 32bits integer (size is multiple of 4bytes)
Array of uint64	0x92	long[]	Array of 64bits integer (size is multiple of 8bytes)
Array of float128	0x93	decimal[]	Array of 128bits floating point (size is multiple of 16bytes)
Array of uint32	0xA0	uint[]	Array of unsigned 32bits integer (size is multiple of 4bytes)
Array of float32	0xA1	float[]	Array of 32bits floating point (size is multiple of 4bytes)
Array of int64	0xA2	ulong[]	Array of unsigned 64bits integer (size is multiple of 8bytes)
Defines string arrays	0x83	string[]	Reserved type for internal use only
Defines Document arrays	0xC3	Document[]	Reserved type for internal use only
Defines HiBON arrays	0x82	HiBON[]	Reserved type for internal use only

Table 15: HiBON Basic data-types

Any data types which are not defined in table 15 are illegal and must be rejected by the network. The types use in table is mostly the types used in D except of a few as {} and [].

A.1 HRPC – HiBON Remote Procedure Call

HRPC works like JSON-RPC just with signed binary data, the above-defined HiBON format. It means the data is hash-invariant enabling hash- and signature functions to be executed fast and

non-ambiguous.

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$type</i>	Set contract type to 'HRPC'	string	ro
<i>\$pkey</i>	Public key	bin	ro
<i>\$sign</i>	Signature of <i>\$msg</i>	bin	ro
<i>\$msg</i>	Message object table 17, table 18, table 19	{}	ro

Table 16: HRPC format

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$id</i>	Message id	uint	ro
<i>\$method</i>	Name of remote call function	string	ro
<i>\$params</i>	Params for the <i>\$method</i> function (optional)	{}	ro

Table 17: HRPC method message object

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$id</i>	Message id	uint	ro
<i>\$result</i>	Result of the <i>\$method</i> call	{}	ro

Table 18: HRPC success message object

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$id</i>	Message id	string	ro
<i>\$msg</i>	Error object table 20	{}	ro

Table 19: HPPC error response object

Parameter	Description	Type	Access
<i>\$code</i>	Set contract type to 'HRPC'	uint	ro
<i>\$msg</i>	Error message	string	ro
<i>\$data</i>	Data object (optional)	[]	ro

Table 20: HRPC error object

B Crypto “Bank” bill

The bill has a value V , public/private key (y, x) and the bank bill number B , which is the hash of the bill.

V can have the value of a natural number: $V \in \mathbb{N}$

This is a newly printed bill:

$$Y_{alice} = H(L_{k+1} \parallel y_{alice}) \quad (10)$$

$$B_{k+1} = H(V \parallel L_{k+1} \parallel t_{k+1} \parallel T \parallel Y_{alice}) \quad (11)$$

(H is a hash function, is the hash of the previous confirmed Bull’s eye, is the consensus timestamp of the current Epoch, is the epoch number and T is the contact type)

The total value of all bills of type T must be accounted for.

$$V_{total,k+1} = V_{total,k+1} + V_k \quad (12)$$

Simple transaction Ownership of the bill can be transferred to Bob, if:

- Bob reveals his public key to Alice
- Alice generates a new bill and signs it with her private key

Because of the network fee, the value will be reduced by ΔV .

$$V_{k+1} = V_k - \Delta V \quad (13)$$

If V_{k+1} is negative or zero, the transaction is eliminated and will not generate a new bill.

$$V_{total,k+1} = \begin{cases} V_{total,k} - \Delta V & \text{if } (V_k - \Delta V \geq 0) \\ V_{total,k} - V_k & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (14)$$

Resulting in:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{bob} &= H(B_k \parallel y_{bob}) \\ B_{k+1} &= H(V \parallel B_k \parallel t_k \parallel k \parallel T \parallel Y_{bob}) \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

The new bill is now written to the DART with key B_{k+1} :

$$V_{k+1}, B_k, t_k, k, T, Y_{bob}$$

The old bill B_k is removed from the DART.

The Split of a crypto bill

A bill can be split into a number of other bills if the combined value of the new nodes matches the original:

$$V_k = \left[\sum_{i=0}^{I-1} V_{k+1,i} \right] + \Delta V \quad (16)$$

Each new bill is generated as:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{k+1,i} &= H(B_k \parallel y_{k+1,i}) \\ B_{k+1,i} &= H(V_{k+1} \parallel B_k \parallel t_k \parallel k \parallel T \parallel Y_{k+1}), \quad y_{k+1,i} \neq y_{k+1,j} \text{ for } (i \neq j) \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

All new bills marked B_{k+1} are stored in the DART as before, and the old bills are removed. Join or collect bills into one bill.

A number of bills can be collated into one bill if the value adds up as follows:

$$V_a = \left[\sum_{i=0}^{I-1} V_{b,i} \right] + \Delta V \quad (18)$$

The new common bill number is generated by hashing a sorted list of the joined bill numbers.

$$B'_k = H(B_{k,0} \parallel B_{k,1} \dots \parallel B_{k,I-1}) \quad (19)$$

The new bill number will be generated:

$$\begin{aligned} Y'_{k+1} &= H(B'_k \parallel y_{k+1}) \\ B_{k+1} &= H(V_a \parallel B'_k \parallel t_k \parallel k \parallel T \parallel Y'_{k+1}) \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

These new consolidated bills are stored in the DART.

C Network

The following steps are executed in the network for a standard transaction:

1. The transaction object is sent to one of the active nodes (an inactive node should relay the transaction object to an active node).
2. When a node receives a transaction object, its format, and signatures of all the inputs are checked.
3. If the transaction object is valid, it is added to the payload of an event.
4. The event is gossiped to the network.
5. The payload is put into an epoch list in order.
6. The epoch list is processed in the epoch order.
7. All inputs to the transaction are collected from the DART database.
8. The transaction script is executed when all inputs are read from the DART.
9. The output of the transaction scripts is gossiped to the network.
10. When the network reaches consensus on all outputs of the transactions, the DART is updated.
11. The new Merkle root (Bull's eye) of the DART is calculated, and the Bull's eye is gossiped to the network.
12. When the majority of the nodes reach consensus on the Bull's eye, it is added to the DART blockchain. The transaction is now approved.

D Network Security

Network attack surface

In the following, the probability of an evil attack on the network is estimated via a simple model.

The network participants are given by the following parameters.

M is the total number of nodes which are available for the network (This includes active and passive nodes, not prospect nodes).

N is the number of active nodes running the networks.

E is the number of nodes controlled by the evil attacker.

n_E is the number of evil nodes among the N active nodes.

The attack scenario is divided into two categories. The first category prevents the network from reaching consensus, and in the second category, the attacker is able to take over the network and decide the faith what is going which transactions going it to a block.

First category:

If the evil attacker wants to prevent the networks of reaching consensus, the evil attacker needs more than 1/3 of the active nodes.

$$\frac{n_E}{N} > \frac{1}{3} \quad (21)$$

Second category:

If the evil attacker wants to take over the network, the attacker needs more than 2/3 of the active nodes.

$$\frac{n_E}{N} > \frac{2}{3} \quad (22)$$

The calculated scenario is based on all the N nodes is changed at every epoch. In the real network, this is not the case; only one node is swapped out and in at every 100 epoch. Thus the probability of an evil takeover is significantly lower than this calculation. The model is chosen because it is easy to express mathematically. The active nodes are selected randomly from M , and the probability that the evil attacker controls the first selected node is: Definition of permutation formula:

$$P(n, r) = \frac{n!}{(n-r)!} \quad (23)$$

Definition of combination formula:

$$C(n, r) = \frac{n!}{(n-r)! \cdot r!} = \frac{P(n, r)}{r!} \quad (24)$$

The probability of an evil node is selected is:

$$p_{E_0} = \frac{E}{M} \quad (25)$$

The probability of selecting an evil node after selected an evil node at the n th time is:

$$p_{E_n} = \frac{E-n}{M-n} \quad (26)$$

The probability of constructing an evil network
In this section, the probability of constructing an evil network is calculated.
The network is randomly constructed by selecting N nodes out of M nodes where E nodes are evil.

A network is defined to be evil if the network contains n_E or more evil nodes out of the N active nodes according to formula first and second category formula above.

The probability that n_E nodes out of N nodes are:

$$p_{E_n} = \prod_{i=0}^{n_E-1} p_{E_i} \cdot \prod_{i=n_E}^{N_E} (1 - p_{E_i}) \cdot C(N, n_E) \Big|_{N_E=\min(E, N)} \quad (27)$$

If $M \gg n_E$ and $E \gg n_E$ the probability can be approximated to:

$$p_{n_E} \approx p_{E_0}^{n_E} \cdot (1 - p_{E_0})^{N-n_E} \cdot C(N, n_E) \text{ for } \frac{E}{M} \approx \frac{E - n_E}{M - n_E} \quad (28)$$

The probability that n_E nodes or more are:

$$p_{n > n_E} = \sum_{i=N_E} n_E p_i \cdot C(N, i) \Big|_{N_E=\min(E, N)} \quad (29)$$

Example if $N = 100$ and $M = 1000$ and the attacker has E nodes, the probability that the attacker can prevent the network of reaching consensus is:

$M = 200$	$M = 1000$	$M = 10000$
$N = 60$	$N = 100$	$N = 100$
$E = 60$	$E = 100$	$E = 500$
$n_E = 21$	$n_E = 34$	$n_E = 34$
$p_{n \geq 20} = 0.199261$	$p_{n \geq 34} = 1.62609 \cdot 10^{-12}$	$p_{n \geq 34} = 5.24507 \cdot 10^{-20}$

For an attacker to take over the network:

$M = 200$	$M = 1000$	$M = 10000$
$N = 60$	$N = 100$	$N = 100$
$E = 60$	$E = 100$	$E = 500$
$n_E = 41$	$n_E = 67$	$n_E = 67$
$p_{n \geq 41} = 4.2687 \cdot 10^{-14}$	$p_{n \geq 67} = 9.34035 \cdot 10^{-54}$	$p_{n \geq 67} = 5.68532 \cdot 10^{-64}$

If we have an epoch time of 10 seconds and the probability is 10^{-53} then the evil attacker can take over the network every 10^{46} years or around 10^{36} the current age of the universe.

Note. For a very large number of M and N the probability can be expressed as a logarithm formula to prevent numerical overflow. Combination expressed as a logarithm formula:

$$\Phi(n, r) = \sum_{k=r+1}^n \ln(k) - \sum_{k=1}^r \ln(k) \quad (30)$$

$$C(n, r) = e^{\Phi(n, r)}$$

The probability expresses as a logarithm:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi_{E_n} &= \left(\sum_{i=0}^{n_E-1} \ln(p_{E_i}) - \sum_{i=n_E}^{N_E} \ln(1 - p_{E_i}) \right) \Big|_{N_E=\min(E,N)} \\ p_{E_n} &= e^{(\Pi_{E_n} + \Phi(N, n_E))}\end{aligned}\tag{31}$$

If $M \gg n_E$ and $E \gg n_E$ the probability can be approximated to:

$$\begin{aligned}p_{E_n} &\approx e^{(n_E \cdot \ln(p_{E_0}) - (N_E - n_E) \cdot (1 - \ln(p_{E_0}) + \Phi(N, n_E)))} \\ &\approx e^{((2 \cdot n_E - N_E) \cdot \ln(p_{E_0}) + n_E - N_E + \Phi(N, n_E))} \text{ for } \frac{E}{M} \approx \frac{E - n_E}{M - n_E}\end{aligned}\tag{32}$$

Security conclusion

By having a volume of, e.g. 1000 nodes and 100 active nodes, which could be a possible amount for a network or shard, then the probability is so low that it will probably never occur in practice. Thus, the actual security is that the nodes are decentralised. Therefore, the node governance protocol is the actual security mechanism, because it regulates the uptake of nodes aiming for it to be democratic, meaning both decentralised and one physical person only having one node.

E DEX Trading Example

An example of the DEX matching and prices-discovery algorithm describe in section 11 is shown in the following tables. The trading-order-queue in table 21 and the two sorted sales list are generated and shown in table 22 and table 23.

No	Type	Size	P	Q	E_{ask}	E_{bid}	Bought	Sold	Id
0	ATO	83TGS	147	10	0.0680	14.7000			
1	ATO	6TGS	138	12	0.0870	11.5000			
2	BTO	785ACL	116	10	0.0862	11.6000			
3	ATO	79TGS	149	10	0.0671	14.9000			
4	ATO	4TGS	113	10	0.0885	11.3000			
5	BTO	217ACL	145	11	0.0759	13.1818			
6	BTO	936ACL	115	13	0.1130	8.8462			
7	BTO	205ACL	145	11	0.0759	13.1818			
8	BTO	949ACL	146	10	0.0685	14.6000			
9	BTO	888ACL	117	10	0.0855	11.7000			
10	BTO	587ACL	112	10	0.0893	11.2000			
11	BTO	314ACL	126	13	0.1032	9.6923			
12	BTO	503ACL	118	12	0.1017	9.8333			
13	ATO	72TGS	106	12	0.1132	8.8333			
14	ATO	57TGS	108	13	0.1204	8.3077			
15	BTO	341ACL	131	12	0.0916	10.9167			
16	ATO	15TGS	127	10	0.0787	12.7000			
17	ATO	43TGS	111	11	0.0991	10.0909			
18	BTO	85ACL	136	12	0.0882	11.3333			
19	ATO	29TGS	144	10	0.0694	14.4000			
20	ATO	63TGS	144	14	0.0972	10.2857			
21	BTO	716ACL	134	11	0.0821	12.1818			
22	ATO	42TGS	139	12	0.0863	11.5833			
23	ATO	37TGS	114	13	0.1140	8.7692			
24	ATO	45TGS	136	10	0.0735	13.6000			
25	ATO	44TGS	131	12	0.0916	10.9167			
26	BTO	87ACL	134	10	0.0746	13.4000			
27	BTO	739ACL	146	13	0.0890	11.2308			
28	ATO	16TGS	138	14	0.1014	9.8571			
29	ATO	42TGS	104	10	0.0962	10.4000			
30	ATO	79TGS	101	12	0.1188	8.4167			
31	BTO	725ACL	117	13	0.1111	9.0000			
32	ATO	3TGS	144	13	0.0903	11.0769			
33	BTO	226ACL	144	12	0.0833	12.0000			
34	ATO	30TGS	140	13	0.0929	10.7692			
35	BTO	526ACL	131	14	0.1069	9.3571			

Table 21: DEX Trading-order-queue

No	Type	Size	P	Q	E_{ask}	E_{bid}	Bought	Sold	Id
14	ATO	57TGS	108	13	0.1204	8.3077			
30	ATO	79TGS	101	12	0.1188	8.4167			
23	ATO	37TGS	114	13	0.1140	8.7692			
13	ATO	72TGS	106	12	0.1132	8.8333			
28	ATO	16TGS	138	14	0.1014	9.8571			
17	ATO	43TGS	111	11	0.0991	10.0909			
20	ATO	63TGS	144	14	0.0972	10.2857			
29	ATO	42TGS	104	10	0.0962	10.4000			
34	ATO	30TGS	140	13	0.0929	10.7692			
25	ATO	44TGS	131	12	0.0916	10.9167			
32	ATO	3TGS	144	13	0.0903	11.0769			
4	ATO	4TGS	113	10	0.0885	11.3000			
1	ATO	6TGS	138	12	0.0870	11.5000			
22	ATO	42TGS	139	12	0.0863	11.5833			
16	ATO	15TGS	127	10	0.0787	12.7000			
24	ATO	45TGS	136	10	0.0735	13.6000			
19	ATO	29TGS	144	10	0.0694	14.4000			
0	ATO	83TGS	147	10	0.0680	14.7000			
3	ATO	79TGS	149	10	0.0671	14.9000			

Table 22: Sort list of ATO or the ask-sales list

No	Type	Size	P	Q	E_{ask}	E_{bid}	Bought	Sold	Id
8	BTO	949ACL	146	10	0.0685	14.6000			
26	BTO	87ACL	134	10	0.0746	13.4000			
7	BTO	205ACL	145	11	0.0759	13.1818			
5	BTO	217ACL	145	11	0.0759	13.1818			
21	BTO	716ACL	134	11	0.0821	12.1818			
33	BTO	226ACL	144	12	0.0833	12.0000			
9	BTO	888ACL	117	10	0.0855	11.7000			
2	BTO	785ACL	116	10	0.0862	11.6000			
18	BTO	85ACL	136	12	0.0882	11.3333			
27	BTO	739ACL	146	13	0.0890	11.2308			
10	BTO	587ACL	112	10	0.0893	11.2000			
15	BTO	341ACL	131	12	0.0916	10.9167			
12	BTO	503ACL	118	12	0.1017	9.8333			
11	BTO	314ACL	126	13	0.1032	9.6923			
35	BTO	526ACL	131	14	0.1069	9.3571			
31	BTO	725ACL	117	13	0.1111	9.0000			
6	BTO	936ACL	115	13	0.1130	8.8462			

Table 23: Sort list of BTO or the bid-sales list

E.1 DEX After the Trading Match

The trade is executed from first order in the queue which is the top of the table 21 and the matching pairs shown in table 24. A BTO order from the table 21 is search in table 22 to see if $E_{bid,BTO} \geq E_{bid,ATO}$ and if the order is a ATO the table 23 is searched and if $E_{ask,ATO} \geq E_{ask,BTO}$ a match is found. The executed trading-orders is shown in table 25 and the order which remains are shown in table 28. The parameter ***Id*** shown in the tables, represents the execution order and matching ***Id*** of the trading pairs and ***No*** is the priority order in the trading-order-queue.

Buyer → Seller	No → No	E_{buyer}	E_{seller}	Bought	Sold	Id
ATO→BTO	1→8	0.0870	0.0685	6.00TGS	87.60ACL	1
BTO→ATO	2→14	11.6000	8.3077	473.54ACL	57.00TGS	2
ATO→BTO	4→26	0.0885	0.0746	4.00TGS	53.60ACL	3
BTO→ATO	5→30	13.1818	8.4167	217.00ACL	25.78TGS	4
BTO→ATO	6→23	8.8462	8.7692	324.46ACL	37.00TGS	5
BTO→ATO	7→13	13.1818	8.8333	205.00ACL	23.21TGS	6
BTO→ATO	9→28	11.7000	9.8571	157.71ACL	16.00TGS	7
BTO→ATO	10→17	11.2000	10.0909	433.91ACL	43.00TGS	8
BTO→ATO	15→20	10.9167	10.2857	341.00ACL	33.15TGS	9
BTO→ATO	18→29	11.3333	10.4000	85.00ACL	8.17TGS	10
BTO→ATO	21→34	12.1818	10.7692	323.08ACL	30.00TGS	11
ATO→BTO	22→33	0.0863	0.0833	18.83TGS	226.00ACL	12
ATO→BTO	25→27	0.0916	0.0890	44.00TGS	494.15ACL	13

Table 24: List of the matching pairs

No	Type	Size	P	Q	E_{ask}	E_{bid}	Bought	Sold	Id
1	ATO	6TGS	138	12	0.0870	11.5000	6.00TGS		1
2	BTO	785ACL	116	10	0.0862	11.6000	473.54ACL		2
4	ATO	4TGS	113	10	0.0885	11.3000	4.00TGS		3
5	BTO	217ACL	145	11	0.0759	13.1818	217.00ACL		4
6	BTO	936ACL	115	13	0.1130	8.8462	324.46ACL		5
7	BTO	205ACL	145	11	0.0759	13.1818	205.00ACL		6
8	BTO	949ACL	146	10	0.0685	14.6000		87.60ACL	1
9	BTO	888ACL	117	10	0.0855	11.7000	157.71ACL		7
10	BTO	587ACL	112	10	0.0893	11.2000	433.91ACL		8
13	ATO	72TGS	106	12	0.1132	8.8333		23.21TGS	6
14	ATO	57TGS	108	13	0.1204	8.3077		57.00TGS	2
15	BTO	341ACL	131	12	0.0916	10.9167	341.00ACL		9
17	ATO	43TGS	111	11	0.0991	10.0909		43.00TGS	8
18	BTO	85ACL	136	12	0.0882	11.3333	85.00ACL		10
20	ATO	63TGS	144	14	0.0972	10.2857		33.15TGS	9
21	BTO	716ACL	134	11	0.0821	12.1818	323.08ACL		11
22	ATO	42TGS	139	12	0.0863	11.5833	18.83TGS		12
23	ATO	37TGS	114	13	0.1140	8.7692		37.00TGS	5
25	ATO	44TGS	131	12	0.0916	10.9167	44.00TGS		13
26	BTO	87ACL	134	10	0.0746	13.4000		53.60ACL	3
27	BTO	739ACL	146	13	0.0890	11.2308		494.15ACL	13
28	ATO	16TGS	138	14	0.1014	9.8571		16.00TGS	7
29	ATO	42TGS	104	10	0.0962	10.4000		8.17TGS	10
30	ATO	79TGS	101	12	0.1188	8.4167		25.78TGS	4
33	BTO	226ACL	144	12	0.0833	12.0000		226.00ACL	12
34	ATO	30TGS	140	13	0.0929	10.7692		30.00TGS	11

Table 25: Orders which are matched and executed

No	Type	Size	P	Q	E_{ask}	E_{bid}	Bought	Sold	Id
14	ATO	57TGS	108	13	0.1204	8.3077		57.00TGS	2
30	ATO	79TGS	101	12	0.1188	8.4167		25.78TGS	4
23	ATO	37TGS	114	13	0.1140	8.7692		37.00TGS	5
13	ATO	72TGS	106	12	0.1132	8.8333		23.21TGS	6
28	ATO	16TGS	138	14	0.1014	9.8571		16.00TGS	7
17	ATO	43TGS	111	11	0.0991	10.0909		43.00TGS	8
20	ATO	63TGS	144	14	0.0972	10.2857		33.15TGS	9
29	ATO	42TGS	104	10	0.0962	10.4000		8.17TGS	10
34	ATO	30TGS	140	13	0.0929	10.7692		30.00TGS	11
25	ATO	44TGS	131	12	0.0916	10.9167	44.00TGS		13
4	ATO	4TGS	113	10	0.0885	11.3000	4.00TGS		3
1	ATO	6TGS	138	12	0.0870	11.5000	6.00TGS		1
22	ATO	42TGS	139	12	0.0863	11.5833	18.83TGS		12

Table 26: Sort list of ATO which are executed

No	Type	Size	P	Q	E_{ask}	E_{bid}	Bought	Sold	Id
8	BTO	949ACL	146	10	0.0685	14.6000		87.60ACL	1
26	BTO	87ACL	134	10	0.0746	13.4000		53.60ACL	3
7	BTO	205ACL	145	11	0.0759	13.1818	205.00ACL		6
5	BTO	217ACL	145	11	0.0759	13.1818	217.00ACL		4
21	BTO	716ACL	134	11	0.0821	12.1818	323.08ACL		11
33	BTO	226ACL	144	12	0.0833	12.0000		226.00ACL	12
9	BTO	888ACL	117	10	0.0855	11.7000	157.71ACL		7
2	BTO	785ACL	116	10	0.0862	11.6000	473.54ACL		2
18	BTO	85ACL	136	12	0.0882	11.3333	85.00ACL		10
27	BTO	739ACL	146	13	0.0890	11.2308		494.15ACL	13
10	BTO	587ACL	112	10	0.0893	11.2000	433.91ACL		8
15	BTO	341ACL	131	12	0.0916	10.9167	341.00ACL		9
6	BTO	936ACL	115	13	0.1130	8.8462	324.46ACL		5

Table 27: Sort list of BTO which are executed

No	Type	Size	P	Q	E_{ask}	E_{bid}	Bought	Sold	Id
0	ATO	83TGS	147	10	0.0680	14.7000			
3	ATO	79TGS	149	10	0.0671	14.9000			
11	BTO	314ACL	126	13	0.1032	9.6923			
12	BTO	503ACL	118	12	0.1017	9.8333			
16	ATO	15TGS	127	10	0.0787	12.7000			
19	ATO	29TGS	144	10	0.0694	14.4000			
24	ATO	45TGS	136	10	0.0735	13.6000			
31	BTO	725ACL	117	13	0.1111	9.0000			
32	ATO	3TGS	144	13	0.0903	11.0769			
35	BTO	526ACL	131	14	0.1069	9.3571			

Table 28: DEX Trading order queue of the orders which are not yet executed

No	Type	Size	P	Q	E_{ask}	E_{bid}	Bought	Sold	Id
32	ATO	3TGS	144	13	0.0903	11.0769			
16	ATO	15TGS	127	10	0.0787	12.7000			
24	ATO	45TGS	136	10	0.0735	13.6000			
19	ATO	29TGS	144	10	0.0694	14.4000			
0	ATO	83TGS	147	10	0.0680	14.7000			
3	ATO	79TGS	149	10	0.0671	14.9000			

Table 29: Sort list of ATO which are not yet executed

No	Type	Size	P	Q	E_{ask}	E_{bid}	Bought	Sold	Id
12	BTO	503ACL	118	12	0.1017	9.8333			
11	BTO	314ACL	126	13	0.1032	9.6923			
35	BTO	526ACL	131	14	0.1069	9.3571			
31	BTO	725ACL	117	13	0.1111	9.0000			

Table 30: Sort list of BTO which are not yet executed

F Gene Distance

Each node has a gene string, which is used to calculate the gene-score of the node. This node-gene is represented as a binary string of bits.

$$\gamma = [b_0, b_1..b_{N-1}] \quad b_i \in \mathbb{B} \quad (33)$$

The gene distance between two nodes A and B is calculated as the number of counted '1' of the *exclusive-or* between the two bits vectors.

$$\Lambda(\gamma_A, \gamma_B) = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} (\gamma_{A,i} \otimes \gamma_{B,i}) \quad (34)$$

The total gene score from a node A to all active nodes can be calculated as:

$$\Lambda_{network} = \frac{1}{M} \cdot \sum_{j=0}^{M-1} \Lambda(\gamma_j, \gamma_A) \quad (35)$$

Where M is the number of active nodes in the network.

The gene of the active node is mutated for each epoch via a UDR random number. A random bit select from the N bits is randomly set to '0' or '1'.

Over time the gene-score between the active nodes are reduced, and this will statistically reduce the score compared to the none active nodes; thereby increasing the probability of none-active to be swapped in as active nodes.

G Mutation rules

In this sections the algorithm of bill gene mutations is described.

G.1 Mutation base

A mutation base vector R is generated as an UDR bit-vector

$$R = [\mu_0, \mu_1 \dots \mu_{N-1}] \quad \mu_i \in \mathbb{B} \quad (36)$$

G.2 Population gene mutation

From a number M of gene vectors T_j a population mutation gene B is defined.

$$B = [\beta_0, \beta_1 \dots \beta_{N-1}] \quad \beta_i \in \mathbb{B} \quad (37)$$

For all 1's for each vector is summed, as follows.

$$s_i = \sum_{j=0}^{M-1} t_{j,i}, \quad t_{j,i} \in \mathbb{B} \quad (38)$$

Where s_i is the sums of 1's for bit i for all vectors T_j and $t_{j,i}$ is the bits in the T_j vectors.

The bits in the population gene is defined as follows.

$$\beta_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (2 \cdot s_i > M) \\ \mu_i & \text{if } (2 \cdot s_i = M) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (39)$$

Where μ_i is the mutation base for the population M .

G.3 Production gene mutation

From a gene pair a and b the production gene is defined as:

$$\gamma_i = \begin{cases} a_i & \text{if } (\mu_i = 0) \\ b_i & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (40)$$

And μ_i is the mutation base of the production mutation.

G.4 Transaction mutation

The bill mutation rules is as follows.

B.1 A population gene B is calculated for all inputs

B.2 The genes of the outputs is production mutated with the epoch gene

The epoch gene is generated for all the outputs as follows:

P.1 A population gene P is calculated for all the transaction output genes

P.2 The previous epoch gene E is produced with P to generate a new E gene

The transaction rewards lottery is selected based on the gene distance between the output gene and the current epoch gene.

H Node Selection

Some basic ideas for random node selection.

The nodes is selected random via a UDR and the function for this selection the is based Fermi Dirac distribution function is used.

$$f(E) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{(E-E_F)/kT}} \quad (41)$$

Where E is the potential energy and E_F is Fermi energy level kT is a boltzmann's constant and temperature.

The potential energy for different parameter for a node such as Trust, Age and the distance to the last epoch where the node was active.

To calculated the potential energy level for a parameter the equation for the potential energy for a spring is used.

$$E_S = \frac{1}{2}k_S \cdot x^2 \quad (42)$$

So the total potential energy for a node is:

$$E_i = \frac{1}{2}(k_T \cdot x_T^2 + k_A \cdot x_A^2 + k_E \cdot (x_E - x_C)^2) \quad (43)$$

The k_T spring constant and the x_T value for the trust.

The k_A spring constant and the x_A value for age.

The k_E spring constant for an epoch and the last epoch x_A and x_C is the current epoch number.

An active node is randomly selected in the following manner a random node i is selected between all registered nodes if $f(E_i) > r_{udr}$. The value r_{udr} is a UDR value between 0 and 1.

I No central key-pair re-generation

Idea to recover key-pair from lost password. When key-pair is generated the first time the key owner will answer a number of questions. If we have N number of questions q_k and related to a_k answers. A seed hash R of a random number is generated which will be used as the seed key for the private key. A new seed Y_a can be generated ¹ from R and a list of answers hashes of answers.

$$\begin{aligned} A_i &= H(H(a_i) || H(q_i)) \\ Y_a &= R \otimes A_0 \otimes \dots A_n \end{aligned} \quad (44)$$

The seed hash R can be regenerated if all the values of A is available.

$$R = Y_a \otimes A_0 \otimes \dots A_n \quad (45)$$

If the password recovery values Y and the questions q_k is stored so that the owner can access those value, which is now named recovery service. The owner creates a passphrase p for this a new a seed phrase is generated.

$$\begin{aligned} P_u &= H(U || H(p)) \\ Y_u &= R \otimes P_u \otimes D_u \\ R &= Y_u \otimes P_u \otimes D_u \end{aligned} \quad (46)$$

To obfuscate the passphrase a hash U of a random number and a device seed D_u stored on the local device. This will scramble a simple password and the value Y_u is stored in the recovery service.

If the key-pair owner forgets the password p then the owner can request the questions q_k from the recovery service and generated the value A and drive the value R . This can be done without been connected to the server.

To validate that the R is correct a hash S of R are is stored on the recovery server.

$$S = H(R) \quad (47)$$

A set of questions can be generated to together with a set of answers and a list of corresponding seed Y can be generated. This way the owner only need to answer M out of N questions and by comparing the hash of R the with the compilation of A and Y values the right combination can be found.

The number of Y values need is:

$$N_Y = (M - N) \cdot N + 1 \quad (48)$$

Ex. If $M = 10$ and $N = 5$ will result in a N_Y of 26.

Of cause it's not recommend to have a high ration between M and N because this can lead to high probability of guessing R .

¹The operator $\otimes$ represents bit exclusive or operator

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List of Abbreviations

ALC	alien-currency
at	active time
ATO	Ask Trade Orders
BFT	Byzantine Fault Tolerant
BSON	Binary JSON
BTO	Bid Trade Orders
cl	contribution loyalty
DART	Distributed Archive of Random Transactions
DEX	Decentralised Exchange
DHT	Distribute Hash Tabel
DLT	Distributed Ledger Technology
gs	Gene score
HiBON	Hash-invariant Binary Object Notation
HTLC	Hashed Time Lock Contract
LN	Lightning Network
MultSig	Multi Signature
NCL	Name Card Label
NCR	Name Card Record
NNC	Network Name Card
NNR	Network Node Record
no	node age
PIA	Parameter Indexed Archive
POW	Prof Of Work
SMT	Sparse Merkle Tree
TMN	Tagion Main Network
TN	Tagion Network
TSN	Tagion Sub Network
TSNA	Tagion Sub Network Account
TSNF	Tagion Sub Network Funds
UDR	Unpredictable Deterministic Random

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